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Abstract
Decision rules matter for monetary policy in a currency union if
the interest rate aﬀects member states diﬀerently. We examine the
consequences for inflation, output and interest rate fluctuations and the
welfare loss of four alternative types of decision procedures. We show
that the alternative decision rules have very dissimilar properties and
that diﬀerent rules favour diﬀerent types of countries. In addition to
asymmetric transmission mechanisms, we consider asymmetric shocks.
We show that it is the combination of a country’s interest rate elasticity
and the covariance between the shocks to the country and the shocks
to the union that determines which decision rule the country would
favour.
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1 Introduction
Interest rate decisions are usually made by a committee rather than by a
single person. In a monetary union, the composition of the monetary policy
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ments.
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board may reflect the union’s regional composition. For example, in the
European Monetary Union (EMU), the Governing Council consists of the
Governors of the National Banks of the EMU countries, and the President,
the Vice President and the four Directors of the European Central Bank
(ECB). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the United States
consists of seven Board members, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York and four of the other eleven regional Reserve Bank presidents,
who vote on a fixed rotation. Because of this regional heterogeneity, it is
possible that committee members are more concerned about economic de-
velopment in their respective home regions than in the union as a whole.
Meade and Sheets (2001) provide empirical evidence for a bias towards the
home region among the members of the FOMC. The ECB, however, is very
explicit about neglecting regional developments, as illustrated by the fol-
lowing statement by President Duisenberg:1”... our decisions today, again
and as always, were based on a Euro area-wide analysis of economic and fi-
nancial developments–and nothing else.” Nevertheless, commentators have
argued that the fact that the majority of the Governing Council consists of
national representatives is likely to give rise to regional influences on policy
decisions.
Committee decisions can be made in several ways. There is a large
literature on diﬀerent types of collective decision-making procedure.2 In
this paper, we will focus on four general types of decision-making procedure
that are particularly relevant for interest rate decisions in a monetary union.
These are: (i) ’union rule’, where the central bank only focuses on union-
wide aggregates; (ii) ’Benthamite rule’ (utilitarian rule), where the central
bank minimizes the sum of national loss functions; (iii) ’majority rule’, where
each board member votes for the interest rate that minimizes losses in their
respective home country; and (iv) ’consensus rule’, where the interest rate
is set as the average of the desired interest rates of each national board
member.
The diﬀerences between (i) and (ii) have been analysed by De Grauwe
(2000), De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001), Nolan (2002) and Gros and Hefeker
(2002a, 2002b). Although the analytical results from De Grauwe (2000),
Nolan (2002) and Gros and Hefeker (2002a, 2002b) point towards impor-
tant diﬀerences between the two rules, the empirical results of De Grauwe
and Piskorski (2001) suggest that the diﬀerences between the two rules are
quantitatively unimportant. Aksoy et al. (2002) compare a union-wide
perspective on the interest rate with nationalistic voting, as well as a com-
bination of the two procedures, which they interpret as the ’ECB rule’. Von
Hagen and Sueppel (1994) and Brueckner (2000) also compare a union-wide
1Statement released at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting
of 9 September 1999.
2For a survey of the literature relevant to monetary policy, see Gerlach-Kristen (2002).
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perspective with decisions based on nationalistic voting.
The present paper contributes to the literature in four ways. First, we
consider a broader set of decision rules than has previously been consid-
ered in this literature. Second, contrary to previous analytical work on the
issue, we apply a ’New Keynesian’ theoretical framework to discuss the im-
plications of alternative decision rules. We then circumvent the less realistic
assumption in the frequently used Barro-Gordon model, where it is assumed
that the monetary policy instrument is the rate of inflation, assumed to be
equal among the union member states.3 By contrast, in the standard open-
economy New Keynesian model, it is assumed that the monetary policy
instrument is the interest rate. This not only allows an analytical discus-
sion of the implications of asymmetry in the interest rate elasticities among
member states, but also adds new insights. Third, we show that the al-
ternative decision rules have very diﬀerent properties qualitatively, as each
rule favours diﬀerent types of country. Moreover, by calibrating the model
with estimates of the divergences in the transmission mechanisms among
EMU members, we demonstrate that the diﬀerences between the alterna-
tive decision rules in terms of welfare could be quantitatively important.
This suggests that the results in De Grauwe and Piskorski (2001) may not
be very robust. Finally, we analyse the consequences of applying the dif-
ferent decision rules when there are asymmetries in both the transmission
mechanism and in shocks to the diﬀerent economies. The earlier literature
has only explored these asymmetries separately, whereas we show that it is
the combination of these two types of asymmetry that matters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic theo-
retical framework, and Section 3 presents the alternative decision rules. In
Section 4, we compare the welfare implications of the alternative decision
rules within our basic framework. This is done both analytically, with the
help of a ’stress indicator’, and by means of a quantitative exercise. Section
5 extends our model to include asymmetries in both the transmission mech-
anisms and in the shocks that aﬀect the economies. Section 6 summarizes
our results.
2 The baseline model
The union consists of n countries. Initially, we focus solely on diﬀerences in
the transmission mechanism and assume that countries are identical except
for their responsiveness to monetary policy. That is, to begin with, we as-
sume that shocks are common to all countries. In Section 5 below, we extend
the model to the situation where there are asymmetries in both transmis-
sion mechanisms and shocks. As we will demonstrate there, a necessary
condition for the diﬀerent decision rules to have non-common eﬀects on wel-
3This assumption is made in De Grauwe (2000) and Nolan (2002).
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fare is that the transmission mechanism diﬀer across countries. Hence, we
find it natural to focus first on the eﬀects of diﬀerences in the transmission
mechanism alone.
Output and inflation for country j are given by:
yj,t = Etyj,t+1 − ϕj (ij,t −Etπj,t+1) + gt, j = 1, 2, ...n (1)
πj,t = βEtπj,t+1 + αyj,t + ut, j = 1, 2, ..., n (2)
where yj,t is the output gap in country j, ij,t is the nominal interest rate,
πj,t is the inflation rate, Et is the expectations operator based on period t
information and gt and ut are iid aggregate demand shocks and cost-push
shocks respectively, which satisfy Etgt+1 = Etut+1 = 0. We assume that n is
’large’, so that economic developments in a given country have a negligible
eﬀect on the rest of the countries. As shown by Galí and Monacelli (2002)
and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2001), the standard New Keynesian model
for a small open economy is isomorphic to the closed economy model and
can be represented as in equations (1) and (2), with appropriate definitions
of the shocks.4 The real exchange rate does not enter the reduced form
explicitly, since there is a linear relationship between the real exchange rate
and the output gap (see Galí and Monacelli, 2002).
As we focus attention on national divergences in the eﬀect of interest
rate changes, we assume that the only parameter that is country specific
is the interest rate elasticity ϕj .5 The empirical evidence points towards
substantial diﬀerences in the output response to the interest rate both among
European countries (see e.g., Dornbusch et al., 1998 and Ehrmann et al.,
2003)) and among regions within the United States (see e.g., Carlino and
DeFina, 1998).
Output and inflation in the union as a whole are given by:
yt =
1
n
nX
j=1
yj,t = Etyt+1 − ϕ(it −Etπt+1) + gt
πt =
1
n
nX
j=1
πj,t = βEtπt+1 + αyt + ut
4 In Galí and Monacelli (2002) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), the real inter-
est rate deviates from its flexible price counterpart. The flexible price real interest rate
depends, among other things, on productivity shocks. In our specification, gt includes
the stochastic part of the flexible price real interest rate. In addition, for simplicity we
have assumed that the steady state real interest rate is zero. We follow Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (2000) by adding a cost-push shock to the Phillips curve.
5One could also consider diﬀerences in the slope of the Phillips curve, α, but this would
not add anything substantial beyond diﬀerences in ϕ.
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where ϕ ≡ 1n
Pn
j=1 ϕj .
Welfare in country j is represented by a standard (period) loss function:
Lj,t =
1
2
£
π2j,t + λy2j,t
¤
, j = 1, 2, ..., n (3)
where we assume that the preferences concerning inflation stability versus
output stability are identical across the countries. The policy objective is
to minimize the discounted sum of all current and expected future period
losses. Galí and Monacelli (2002) show that the true welfare loss function
for a small open economy under certain assumptions can be approximated
by (3).
When considering monetary policy we assume that the central bank fol-
lows a time-consistent policy by optimizing in each period (discretion). As
argued by Svensson (1999), the way that central banks operate in practice is
best described as decision making under discretion rather than commitment.
In the model considered here, the reaction function under a discretionary
policy implies that the interest rate is a (linear) function of the state vari-
ables, that is, gt and ut, and private sector expectations. Since there is no
intrinsic inertia in the model, either in terms of lagged responses or auto-
correlated shocks, the minimum-state-variable solution, which is the natural
solution to consider for the purpose of this paper, is then characterized by:
Etyj,t+1 = Etπj,t+1 = 0 ∀j = 1, 2, ..., n. We can therefore neglect expected
future losses and focus solely on the period loss function (3) when evaluating
welfare.
3 Monetary policy
3.1 Independent monetary policy
Consider first the case where the countries conduct independent monetary
policies. The monetary policy instrument is the nominal interest rate ij,t.
Minimizing the loss function (3) with respect to ij,t gives the following first-
order condition:
απj,t + λyj,t = 0. (4)
Inserting equations (1) and (2) into (4), and remembering that expected
future output and inflation are equal to zero, gives the following solution for
the optimal independent policy:
i∗j,t =
1
ϕj
·
gt +
α
α2 + λut
¸
j = 1, 2, ...n. (5)
This gives the following solutions for output and inflation under the optimal
(time-consistent) monetary policy:
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yj,t =
α
α2 + λut j = 1, 2, ...n.
πj,t =
λ
α2 + λut j = 1, 2, ...n.
Under the optimal independent policy, output and inflation fluctuations are
aﬀected by the interest rate responsiveness of the country. ϕj only enters
the solution for the interest rate. The intuition is that whatever the interest
rate responsiveness is, the interest rate is always adjusted to keep output
insulated from aggregate demand shocks and to keep a constant relationship
between inflation and output when cost-push shocks occur. A low interest
rate elasticity simply leads the central bank to change the interest rate more
aggressively.
3.2 Common monetary policy
Consider then the case where the n countries form a monetary union. Then,
the union central bank must decide whether regional divergences in the
transmission mechanism should influence policy and, if so, how the central
bank should take account of such regional divergences when setting the in-
terest rate. There are several alternatives that the union central bank can
choose concerning interest rate decisions. We consider four types of decision-
making model that have been suggested in the literature: (i) ’union rule’,
where the central bank only focuses on union-wide aggregates, (ii) ’Ben-
thamite rule’ (utilitarian rule), where the central bank minimizes the sum of
national loss functions; (iii) ’majority rule’, where each board member votes
for the interest rate that minimizes losses in their respective home country;
and (iv) ’consensus rule’, where the interest rate is set as a (weighted) aver-
age of the desired interest rates of each national board member. We analyse
each decision rule in turn and then compare them.
3.2.1 Union rule
The ’union rule’ is defined as the interest rate that minimizes the loss func-
tion (3), but where national inflation and output are replaced by union
inflation and output, i.e.:
iUt = arg


min
1
2
[
i
π2t + λy2t ]


 (6)
6
This rule seems to correspond to the oﬃcial policy rule of the ECB. The
solution for the interest rate under the ’union rule’ is found by simply remov-
ing the country subscript from equation (5). The solution for the interest
rate and for output and inflation in each country are given by:
iUt =
1
ϕ
·
gt +
α
α2 + λut
¸
(7)
yUj,t =
ϕ− ϕj
ϕ gt −
ϕjα
ϕ(α2 + λ)ut j = 1, 2, ..., n.
πUj,t =
α(ϕ− ϕj)
ϕ gt +
α2(ϕ− ϕj) + ϕλ
ϕ(α2 + λ) ut j = 1, 2, ..., n.
where yUj,t and πUj,t denote output and inflation in country j under the ’union
rule’. We see that aggregate demand shocks aﬀect output and inflation to
the extent that the country’s interest rate responsiveness deviates from the
union average. Likewise, the cost-push shocks are not optimally distributed
between output and inflation if the interest rate responsiveness deviates from
the union average. If ϕj < ϕ, too much of the cost-push shock shows up in
inflation variability. If ϕj > ϕ, output variability is too high compared to
inflation variability.
3.2.2 Benthamite rule
An alternative to aggregating the arguments in the loss function is to ag-
gregate the individual loss functions. This ’Benthamite rule’, based on a
utilitarian approach to utility aggregation, can be specified as:
iBt = arg


min
1
2

 1
n
nX
j=1
Lj,t




 (8)
The first-order condition for minimizing (8) is:
nX
j=1
¡
ϕjαπj,t + ϕjλyj,t
¢
= 0. (9)
As shown in Appendix A.1, the solution for the interest rate under the
’Benthamite rule’ is given by:
iBt =
1
ϕ+ d
·
gt +
α
α2 + λut
¸
, (10)
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where
d ≡ 1ϕn2
n−1X
j=1
nX
h>j
(ϕj − ϕh)2 ≥ 0.
d measures the degree of divergence in interest rate responsiveness among
the union members. If there is no divergence, d = 0, while d > 0 if at least
one member diﬀers from the other. We see from (10) that monetary policy
is less activist under the ’Benthamite rule’ than under the ’union rule’, and
that the responsiveness to shocks is lower the more heterogenous the union
members are.
To understand the intuition for this result, assume that n = 3 and that
ϕ1 < ϕ2 = ϕ < ϕ3 and gt > 0. Note that under the ’union rule’, the central
bank completely oﬀsets the eﬀect of demand shocks on union output, so
that country 1 (the least interest rate sensitive) faces a positive output
gap, country 2 faces a zero output gap, and country 3 faces a negative
output gap that exactly oﬀsets country 1’s positive gap. Consider then
a marginal reduction of the rate from the level implied by the ’union rule’.
Since country 2 is already at its optimum, the loss from a marginal reduction
of the interest rate is of second order and can be ignored. However, country
3 (the most interest rate sensitive) would experience a (first-order) gain in
terms of inflation and an output gap that are less negative, while country 1
would experience a (first-order) loss. However, country 3’s gain more than
outweighs country 1’s loss because of the higher interest rate elasticity in
country 3. Hence, the ’Benthamite rule’, which minimizes the sum of the
national losses, implies a lower interest rate than the ’union rule’.
Output and inflation under the ’Benthamite rule’ are found by inserting
(10) into (1) and (2):
yBj,t =
ϕ+ d− ϕj
ϕ+ d gt −
ϕjα
(ϕ+ d)(α2 + λ)ut j = 1, 2, ..., n.
πBj,t =
α(ϕ+ d− ϕj)
ϕ+ d gt +
α2(ϕ+ d− ϕj) + (ϕ+ d)λ
(ϕ+ d)(α2 + λ) ut j = 1, 2, ..., n.
3.2.3 Majority rule
It was implicitly assumed above that the interest rate decision was taken by
a single person. In most central banks, however, interest rate decisions are
made by a board. Blinder and Morgan (2000) list three general types of col-
lective decision procedure: (i) letting the median voter decide; (ii) reaching
a consensus where each member has the same influence on the decision (av-
eraging); and (iii) letting the most skilled member decide. Since we assume
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that all members are equally skilled, we will not consider type (iii). If all
the board members have a union-wide perspective, either represented by the
’union rule’ or the ’Benthamite rule’, the decisions made by a single person
and those made by a board will be identical. If board members instead have
a national perspective, the type of decision-making procedure may matter.
To analyse this case, suppose that the interest rate is decided by a board
of n members, each representing his or her home country. Suppose further
that the individual board members are only concerned about economic con-
ditions in their home countries and that the interest rate decision is taken
by majority voting, i.e., type (i) in Blinder and Morgan’s general listing. We
label this rule the ’majority rule’. Since the median voter theorem applies,
the ’majority rule’ is specified as:
iMt = med
£
i∗1,t, i
∗
2,t, ..., i
∗
n,t
¤
,
where i∗j,t is given by equation (5). From Section 3.1, the median voter’s
preferred interest rate is given by:
iMt =
1
ϕm
·
gt +
α
α2 + λut
¸
, (11)
where ϕm is the median of ϕ1,ϕ2, ...,ϕn.
Does nationalistic voting result in a diﬀerent policy from the situation
where board members only care about union-wide economic conditions?
The answer depends on how asymmetric the distribution of ϕs is–that
is, whether the median diﬀers from the mean. If ϕm < ϕ, monetary pol-
icy is more activist under the ”majority rule” than under the ”union rule”,
whereas the opposite is true if ϕm > ϕ. As a baseline case, however, it is nat-
ural to assume that the distribution of ϕs within the union is symmetric, so
that ϕm = ϕ.6 Then, the interest rate under nationalistic voting is equal to
the interest rate under the union-wide perspective represented by the ’union
rule’. Thus, divergent transmission mechanisms among union members do
result in conflicts of interest among members, but do not necessarily lead
to a diﬀerent policy outcome compared to the situation where all member
countries are equally aﬀected by interest rate changes. Thus, in the case
of symmetrically distributed ϕs, the policy outcome of both the ’majority
rule’ and the ’union rule’ is not aﬀected by the type of divergence considered
here.7 However, the ’Benthamite rule’ exploits divergence among member
countries in order to minimize the sum of national losses.
6Ehrmann et al. (2003) presents estimates of the interest rate elasticity in nine EMU
countries, where the mean and the median are very close to each other. See Section 4.2
below, where we apply their estimates for a numerical illustration.
7 In general, however, the ’majority rule’ and the ’union rule’ will result in a diﬀerent
policy outcome if there is less than perfect correlation of shocks among the countries, see
Section 5.
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3.2.4 Consensus rule
Although interest rate decisions in most central banks are formally taken by
majority voting, there is also a tradition for consensus decisions (type (ii) in
Blinder and Morgan’s categorization). For example, as far as we know, the
ECB council has never taken a formal vote on interest rate decisions, but
agrees on all its moves by consensus. We will interpret a consensus decision
as a compromise between conflicting interests. Specifically, we assume that
the ’consensus rule’ is given by:
iCt =
1
n
nX
j=1
i∗j,t (12)
where i∗j,t is given by (5). The ’consensus rule’ may also be interpreted
as a bargaining solution where all members have equal bargaining power.
Gerlach-Kristen (2002) compares ’majority rules’ and ’consensus rules’ (the
latter denoted as ’averaging’) when board members have equal preferences
but diﬀer in their ability to estimate the output gap. Aksoy et al. (2002)
also consider the ’consensus rule’, but their motivation for the rule is that
(12) is, in their view, a good proxy for the union-wide rule represented by
(6), which they do not estimate owing to data limitations. However, we shall
see that (12) is not a good proxy for (6) if the interest rate responsiveness
diﬀers among union members.
We show in Appendix A.2 that the interest rate under the ’consensus
rule’ is given by:
iCt =
1
ϕ− d0
·
gt +
α
α2 + λut
¸
, (13)
where:
0 ≤ d0 ≡
Pn−1
j=1
Pn
h>j(ϕj − ϕh)2
Qn
k 6=j,h ϕk
n
Qn
j=1 ϕj
Pn
j=1 ϕ
−1
j
< ϕ.
Note that d0 is also a measure of the degree of divergence in the interest rate
responsiveness among the union members, and is thus closely related to d.
Since d0 > 0 if at least one country diﬀers in interest rate responsiveness
from the others, we see that monetary policy under the ’consensus rule’ is
more activist than monetary policy under the ’union rule’ and the ’majority
rule’. This is a result of Jensen’s inequality: since 1ϕ is convex in ϕ, the
mean of 1ϕ is larger than the inverse of the mean of ϕ. More intuition can be
provided by again considering the case where n = 3, ϕ1 < ϕ2 = ϕ < ϕ3, and
gt > 0. Country 2 would then prefer the interest rate set under the ’union
rule’, whereas country 1 prefers a higher interest rate, and country 3 prefers
a lower interest rate. Since country 1 is the least interest rate sensitive,
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the diﬀerence between its desired rate and country 2’s is higher than the
corresponding diﬀerence between countries 2 and 3. It follows that average
preferred interest rate among the member countries (i.e., the rate set under
the ’consensus rule’) is higher than the one set under the ’union rule’.
The solutions for output and inflation under the ’consensus rule’ are
given by:
yCj,t =
ϕ− d0 − ϕj
ϕ− d0 gt −
ϕjα
(ϕ− d0)(α2 + λ)ut j = 1, 2, ..., n.
πUj,t =
α(ϕ− d0 − ϕj)
ϕ− d0 gt +
α2(ϕ− d0 − ϕj) + (ϕ− d0)λ
(ϕ− d0)(α2 + λ) ut j = 1, 2, ..., n.
4 Welfare implications of alternative decision rules
The ultimate judgement of the alternative decision rules should be how
they aﬀect welfare, which is measured by the loss function for the individual
country in our model. In this section, we analyse welfare implications both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
4.1 The stress of living with a common interest rate
From the above solutions for output and inflation under the alternative rules,
we see that the alternative decision rules give the same outcome if the coun-
ties in the union are perfectly symmetric. However, if there are asymmetries
in the transmission mechanisms, conflicts of interest may emerge in regard
to which rule to apply. In order to perform welfare comparisons under the
diﬀerent rules, we derive a ’stress indicator’ based on a Taylor approxima-
tion around the optimal (time-consistent) policy under monetary autonomy.
Then, we have:
Lj,t(ij,t) ≈ Lj,t(i∗j,t) + L0j,t(i∗j,t)(ij,t − i∗j,t) +
1
2
L00j,t(i
∗
j,t)(ij,t − i∗j,t)2 (14)
= Lj,t(i
∗
j,t) +
1
2
L00j,t(i
∗
j,t)(ij,t − i∗j,t)2,
where L0j,t(i∗j,t) = 0 under the optimal policy and terms higher than order
two are equal to zero owing to the linear-quadratic structure of the model.
The ’stress indicator’ is then given by:
Shj,t = L
h
j,t − L∗j,t = L00j (i∗j,t)(iht − i∗j,t)2 =
1
2
ϕ2j(α2 + λ)(iht − i∗j,t)2, (15)
11
h = U,B,M,C.
Even if the S is derived from a Taylor approximation, it can easily be
verified that (15) gives an exact measure of the welfare loss for static linear-
quadratic models of the type considered here. We see that the cost of giving
up monetary autonomy is not only related to how much the common mon-
etary policy diﬀers from the optimal independent policy, but also to how
strongly the economy is aﬀected by monetary policy. A given deviation
from the optimal interest rate is less costly for the country if output and
inflation are less aﬀected by interest rate changes.
To simplify notation and draw attention to the important diﬀerences be-
tween the decision rules, we now aggregate the diﬀerent shocks according to
zt ≡ gt+ αα2+λut. Making use of equations (7), (10), (11) and (13) and taking
the expectation through the expression for Sj,t yields the following expres-
sions for the ’expected stress’ for country j under the alternative decision
rules for the union central bank:
ESUj,t =
1
2
ϕ−2(α2 + λ)var(zt)[ϕj − ϕ]2, (16)
ESBj,t =
1
2
(ϕ+ d)−2(α2 + λ)var(zt)[ϕj − (ϕ+ d)]2, (17)
ESMj,t =
1
2
ϕ−2m (α2 + λ)var(zt)[ϕj − ϕm]2 (18)
ESCj,t =
1
2
(ϕ− d0)−2(α2 + λ)var(zt)[ϕj − (ϕ− d0)]2. (19)
By comparing the above expressions, we see that a country that has the
same interest rate elasticity as the union average would prefer the ’union
rule’ (or the ’majority rule’ if the mean is equal to the median). A coun-
try that is more interest rate elastic than the union average would prefer
the ’Benthamite rule’, since the ”optimal” interest rate elasticity under the
’Benthamite rule’ is ϕj = ϕ+ d. A country that is less interest rate elastic
would prefer the ’consensus rule’, since the ”optimal” elasticity under this
rule is ϕj = ϕ−d0. Thus, the alternative decision rules favour diﬀerent types
of country.
From a political economy point of view, the ’union rule’, which describes
the Euro-wide perspective of the ECB, has the advantage that regional dif-
ferences per se are not taken into account when the interest rate is set.
This may limit the scope for regional lobbyism and make the monetary pol-
icy decision less subject to political pressure. As shown above, the ’union
rule’ can also be regarded as a decision rule that does not favour countries
that are very diﬀerent from the union average concerning the transmission
mechanism. Of the alternative decision rules considered, it may therefore
be easier to gain acceptance for the ’union rule’, as well as the ’majority
rule’. Nevertheless, the total welfare for the union can be higher under the
’Benthamite rule’, although some of the welfare gain comes from sacrificing
12
Table 1. Expected loss for EMU nations under alternative rules
Country ϕj ELUj ELMj ELBj ELCj
Italy 0.12 31.3 27.2 39.1 20.4
Spain 0.14 23.6 19.5 31.7 13.0
France 0.20 6.9 4.4 14.0 0.7
Germany 0.20 6.9 4.4 14.0 0.7
Austria 0.25 0.6 0.0 4.7 2.1
Belgium 0.32 3.3 7.9 0.0 21.8
Ireland 0.32 3.3 7.9 0.0 21.8
Finland 0.44 39.1 58.2 14.6 103.8
Netherlands 0.45 43.9 64.5 17.1 113.4
Sum 158.9 193.3 135.2 297.9
welfare in less interest-rate elastic countries. If the regional welfare distribu-
tion is considered important, the ’Benthamite rule’ could be less problematic
if appropriate compensation schemes were feasible.
4.2 A quantitative illustration
The preceding subsection demonstrated that, when the impact of monetary
policy diﬀers among member states, the eﬀects on welfare of joining a mon-
etary union depend on the decision rule followed by the union central bank.
In this section, we calibrate the model to investigate whether our results
could be of quantitative importance. We calibrate the parameters of the
model by drawing on existing literature on policy rules.
Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), we set the relative weight on
output gap fluctuations λ equal to 1. The sacrifice ratio α is set to 0.05 as
in Jensen (2002). Galí and Monacelli (2002) calibrate their model so that
it delivers a standard deviation of the natural rate of output of 0.02. We
use this value in calibrating the standard deviation of our demand shock,
σg = 0.02. As a (reasonable) baseline value, we also use 0.02 for the standard
deviation of inflation shocks σu. In calibrating the elasticities of output with
respect to the interest rate, we adapt the empirical estimates for nine EMU
nations reported in Ehrmann et al. (2003). For concreteness, we assign
country names to our nine members, but we assume (for simplicity) that
they are of the same size. The elasticities are in the range of 0.12 (Italy) to
0.45 (Netherlands). The mean elasticity is 0.27, while Austria is the median
country with ϕ equal to 0.25. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values
and the expected loss under the alternative decision rules, expressed as a
percentage increase relative to the optimal independent monetary policy.
Several aspects of these numbers are noteworthy. First, there are large
variations across countries for given decision rules. While the increase in
loss is zero or negligible for the countries that are least aﬀected, the loss
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of giving up monetary independence is quantitatively important for some
countries, regardless of the decision rule. Generally, it is the countries at
the tails of the distribution of elasticities that ’suﬀer’ the most for all rules.
Second, the increase in loss for a given country varies substantially across
decision rules. This result is at odds with Aksoy et al. (2002), who report
that the diﬀerences in loss between diﬀerent decision regimes tend to be
limited. The Netherlands (the most interest rate-sensitive country), for
instance, experiences an increase in loss that is almost seven times bigger
under the ’consensus rule’ compared to the ’Benthamite rule’. Third, and
confirming our results in the previous subsection, members with elasticities
above the average prefer the union central bank to apply the ’Benthamite
rule’, while countries with ϕs below the average prefer the ’consensus rule’.
Fourth, the ’union rule’ provides the most evenly distributed increase in
loss, while the ’consensus rule’ gives the most uneven distribution. As an
illustration of this latter point, we note that the four countries with above-
average elasticities bear close to 90 per cent of the burden (of the increases
in loss) under the ’consensus rule’. Finally, the sum of the increase in loss
across countries is larger under the ’consensus rule’ than under the ’union
rule’ and the ’majority rule’. (It is obviously lowest in a ’Benthamite regime’,
as the central bank would then minimize the sum of losses.) The intuition
is that the ’consensus rule’ pulls the interest rate further away from the one
preferred by the most interest rate-sensitive countries than does the ’union
rule’. Since these countries are interest rate sensitive, this creates ’big’ losses
for them. The ’union rule’ implies an interest rate that is further away from
the preferred one for the least sensitive countries than does the ’consensus
rule’. However, since these countries are not very interest rate sensitive,
their losses are relatively small, giving a moderate increase in aggregate
losses relative to the ’Benthamite rule’. In this particular example, the
increase in aggregate loss under the ’consensus rule’ is almost twice as large
as with that under ’union rule’.
5 Extension: Asymmetric shocks
In order to focus solely on the transmission mechanism, it was assumed above
that shocks were common to all members of the union. Here, we depart
from this assumption and consider asymmetric shocks. When analysing
the alternative decision rules under asymmetric shocks, it is important to
consider asymmetric shocks and asymmetric transmission mechanisms in
combination. As will be clear from the analysis below, the results of the
alternative decision rules will be identical if the transmission mechanisms
are symmetric, even though shocks are asymmetric.
Suppose that the aggregate shocks z consist of an idiosyncratic part and
a common part, given by:
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zj,t = z
i
j,t + βjzt, (20)
where zij,t is a pure idiosyncratic shock, assumed to be white noise, zt is
a common shock and βj measures the systematic covariance of shocks be-
tween country j and the union. By varying βj and the variance of zij,t, the
decomposition enables us to consider a general set of potential asymmetries.
Accordingly, βj =
cov(zj,t,zt)
var(zt)
and thus measures the ”systematic risk” of the
country as a member of the ”union portfolio” of countries. That is, βj may
be positive or negative, and it satisfies
Pn
j=1 βj = 1. We assume for simplic-
ity that a given country’s β is the same concerning demand shocks gt as for
cost-push shocks ut, so that we can multiply the combined shock zt by the
common factor β. To facilitate comparison with the results under common
shocks presented above, we also make the assumption that the cross-country
distributions of idiosyncratic shocks zij,t, the ”systematic risks” βj , and the
interest rate elasticities ϕj are independent of each other.
As 1n
Pn
j=1 βj = 1, the solution of the interest rate under the ’union rule’
is unaﬀected by introducing asymmetric shocks. Formally,
iUt =
1
ϕ
1
n
nX
j=1
zij,t +
1
ϕzt
∼=
1
ϕzt. (21)
Since we have assumed that n is ’large’, the average idiosyncratic shock,
1
n
Pn
j=1 z
i
j,t, approaches zero.
To find the interest rate under the ’Benthamite rule’, we solve for the
interest rate from the first-order condition (9) and find that:
iBt =
nX
j=1
Ã
ϕj
ϕ2j
zij,t +
ϕjβj
ϕ2j
zt
!
∼=
nX
j=1
ϕjβj
ϕ2j
zt, (22)
where the second (approximate) equality follows from the law of large num-
bers.8 The assumption of independent βs and ϕs implies that:
lim
n→∞
1
n
nX
i=1
ϕjβj =
1
n
nX
i=1
ϕj = ϕ. (23)
8We observe that the interest rate response to shocks is not necessarily the same in the
case where both shocks and the transmission mechanisms are asymmetric as in the case
where only the transmission mechanisms are asymmetric. Depending on the combinations
of ϕs and βs, the coeﬃcient on zt may be higher or lower than in the case of symmetric
shocks. For example, if countries with high interest rate sensitivity also tend to have βs
above unity, the ’Benthamite’ response would be larger under asymmetric shocks than
under symmetric shocks. Moreover, it is possible to construct combinations of ϕ0s and β0s
that imply that the interest rate response to shocks is higher under the ’Benthamite rule’
than in the ’union rule’. Although this ambiguity is an interesting result, we focus on the
case where the distribution of β is independent of the distribution of ϕ, as this facilitates
comparison with our earlier results.
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We will assume that n is suﬃciently large to apply this limit. Then, the
coeﬃcient on the shock is identical to the one under symmetric shocks, i.e.:
iBt =
1
ϕ+ dzt, (24)
where d is defined as in Section 4.
To find the solution for the interest rate under the ’majority rule’, note
that the desired interest rate for each country is given by:
i∗j,t =
1
ϕj
zj,t +
βj
ϕj
zt. (25)
Then, the ’majority rule’ gives:
iMt = med[
1
ϕ1
zi1,t +
β1
ϕ1
zt,
1
ϕ2
zi2,t +
β2
ϕ2
zt, ...,
1
ϕn
zin,t +
βn
ϕn
zt].
In order to find a unique solution, we look at the case where z, β, and
ϕ are symmetrically distributed (in addition to being independent). For a
suﬃciently large n, the idiosyncratic shock to the median country would
then be (close to) zero and:
iMt =
1
ϕzt. (26)
The interest rate under the ’consensus rule’ is given by:
iCt =
1
n
nX
j=1
µβj
ϕj
zj,t +
βj
ϕj
zt
¶
=
1
n
nX
j=1
βj
ϕj
zt, (27)
Exploiting the limit in (23) again, our independence assumption implies that
this expression can be reduced to:
iCt =
1
n
nX
j=1
1
ϕj
zt =
1
ϕ− d0 zt, (28)
where d0 is defined in Section 4.
We are now able to solve for the cost of union participation for a given
country under the assumptions of n being ’large’ and β and ϕ being un-
correlated. Inserting equations (21), (24), (25), (26) and (28) into (15) and
taking the expectations gives:
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ESUj,t = ES
M
j,t =
1
2
(α2 + λ)[var(zij,t) +
(ϕj − βjϕ)2
ϕ2 var(zt)], (29)
ESBj,t =
1
2
(α2 + λ)[var(zij,t) +
(ϕj − βj(ϕ+ d))2
(ϕ+ d)2 var(zt)], (30)
ESCj,t =
1
2
(α2 + λ)[var(zij,t) +
(ϕj − βj(ϕ− d0))2
(ϕ− d0)2 var(zt)]. (31)
The variance of pure idiosyncratic shocks enters similarly under the alterna-
tive decision rules because the union central bank does not respond to pure
idiosyncratic shocks, as these tend to average out. From (29)-(31), we also
see that with symmetric elasticities across union members (i.e., d = d0 = 0),
welfare is independent of the decision rules followed by the common central
bank. Thus, asymmetric shocks alone do not create diﬀerences between the
rules in terms of welfare.9
By considering asymmetric transmission mechanisms and asymmetric
shocks in combination, the results from Section 4 can be modified in an in-
tuitive way. With common shocks, we saw that it is the elasticity of country
j compared to the average of the union that determines which rule j prefers.
Under asymmetric shocks, (29)-(31) demonstrate that it is country j’s ra-
tio of elasticity to ”systematic risk” (i.e,. ϕj/βj) compared to the average
union elasticity that governs the preferred rule. A country where this ratio
is equal to ϕ prefers the ’union rule’ or ’majority rule’. For instance, with
idiosyncratic shocks, a country with ϕj > ϕ may still prefer the ’union rule’
if it is a ”high-risk” country (βj > 1). By the same token, the ’Benthamite
rule’ now favours countries with average interest rate responsiveness, given
that they are less aﬀected by common shocks than the union average. The
reason is that the ’Benthamite rule’ is less activist than the ’union rule’ and
the ’majority rule’, so the interest rate response will tend to be too weak
for a country with average interest rate sensitivity, unless the country is less
aﬀected by common shocks than the union average, i.e,. βj < 1. The result
for ’consensus rule’ is the opposite. Since this rule is more activist than
the ’union rule’ and the ’majority rule’, the interest rate response tends to
be too strong for a country with average interest rate sensitivity, unless the
country is more aﬀected by common shocks than the average, i.e., βj > 1.
6 Summary and final remarks
We have examined four monetary policy decision rules in a monetary union
where members have diﬀerent interest rate elasticities. Our main findings
are as follows. First, the ’Benthamite rule’ gives the least activist monetary
9This is also noted by De Grauwe (2000).
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policy, while the ’consensus rule’ implies the highest variability of the in-
terest rate. The ’union’ and ’majority’ rules give variability somewhere in
between.10 Second, there are important welfare eﬀects of these diﬀerences in
interest rate decisions. Unambiguous insights can be reached when shocks
are (largely) common in nature. Then, countries with an interest rate elas-
ticity close to the union average (median) prefer the ’union rule’ (’majority
rule’). Countries with elasticities (significantly) above the average are better
oﬀ with the ’Benthamite rule’, whereas those with elasticities (significantly)
below the average prefer the ’consensus rule’. In eﬀect, the ’Benthamite
rule’ gives more weight to the preferences of the most interest rate-sensitive
member states, while the opposite is true for the ’consensus rule’. Our cali-
bration exercise indicates that these welfare eﬀects could be quantitatively
important. Third, if, in addition, there are (important) asymmetric shocks,
an individual country’s ratio of interest rate elasticity to ”systematic risks”
should be compared to the average union elasticity. Given this modification,
the ranking of the diﬀerent rules for a given country is the same as for purely
common shocks.
The four types of decision rules considered here are somewhat stylized.
In practice, actual interest decisions may not follow the formal description
exactly, and they may have elements from more than one type of rule. In-
creased transparency among central banks may help identify how interest
rate decisions are made in practice. This paper shows that the manner in
which interest rate decisions in a monetary union are made has some im-
portant implications for the choice of interest rate and also sheds some light
on which types of country would benefit from the various types of decision
rule. In our ’consensus rule’, we assumed that each union member would
not act strategically by reporting a false desired interest rate in order to
aﬀect the collective decision. A topic for future work is to consider how
and when strategic behaviour among union members can aﬀect the collec-
tive decision. In an extension of this, future research should also analyse
institutional arrangements that can prevent such strategic behaviour.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of equation (10)
Inserting equations (1) and (2) into the first-order condition (9) and solving
for it yields:
iBt =
Pn
j=1 ϕjPn
j=1 ϕ2j
[gt + (α2 + λ)−1ut] (32)
10This ranking of the ’majority rule’ requires that the distribution of elasticities among
the member states not be ’too skewed’.
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To be consistent with equation (10), we must have:
Pn
j=1 ϕjPn
j=1 ϕ2j
=
1
1
n
Pn
j=1 ϕj + d
. (33)
Solving for d gives:
d =
n
Pn
j=1 ϕ2j − (
Pn
j=1 ϕj)(
Pn
j=1 ϕj)
n
Pn
j=1 ϕj
=
Pn−1
j=1
Pn
h>j(ϕj − ϕh)2
ϕn2 (34)
A.2 Derivation of equation (13)
Inserting equation (5) into (12) gives:
iCt =
1
n
nX
j=1
1
ϕj
[gt + (α2 + λ)−1ut] (35)
=
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1
n
Qn
j=1 ϕj
[gt + (α2 + λ)−1ut]
To be consistent with (13), we must have:
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1
n
Qn
j=1 ϕj
=
1
1
n
Pn
j=1 ϕj − d0
(36)
Solving for d0 yields:
d0 =
( 1n
Pn
j=1 ϕj)(ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1)− n
Qn
j=1 ϕj
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1
=
1
n(ϕ1 − ϕ2)2ϕ3ϕ4...ϕn + (ϕ1 − ϕ3)2ϕ2ϕ4...ϕn + (ϕ1 − ϕ4)2ϕ2ϕ3...ϕn + ......
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1
+
1
n(ϕ2 − ϕ3)2ϕ1ϕ4...ϕn + (ϕ2 − ϕ4)2ϕ1ϕ3ϕ5...ϕn + (ϕ2 − ϕ5)2ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4ϕ6...ϕn
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1
+
1
n(ϕ3 − ϕ4)2ϕ1ϕ2ϕ5...ϕn + (ϕ3 − ϕ5)2ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4ϕ6...ϕn + (ϕ3 − ϕ6)2ϕ1ϕ2ϕ5ϕ7...ϕn
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1
+.....
1
n(ϕn−1 − ϕn)2ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3...ϕn−2
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1
=
Pn−1
j=1
Pn
h>j((ϕj − ϕh)2
Qn
k 6=j,h ϕk)
n
¡
ϕ2ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ3ϕ4..ϕn + ϕ1ϕ2ϕ4..ϕn + ....ϕ1ϕ2ϕ3..ϕn−1
¢
=
Pn−1
j=1
Pn
h>j(ϕj − ϕh)2
Qn
k 6=j,h ϕk
n
Qn
j=1 ϕj
Pn
j=1 ϕ
−1
j
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